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CLIMATE OF CONFUSION: CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF AMERICAN
ELECTRIC POWER V. CONNECTICUT
James Flynn*
“Global warming is unequivocal and primarily human-induced.”1
INTRODUCTION
The above quote, the first key finding in the executive summary of
the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s report on climate
change impacts in the United States,2 reflects the clear consensus
view of climate researchers3 about climate change.4 The climate is
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law; Assistant Legislation Editor,
Georgia State University Law Review; Visiting Student, Florida State University College of Law. I
would like to offer special thanks to Professor Max Rowberry, who provided invaluable insight and time
(of which he has little free) to this Comment. Thanks also to all of the Law Review editors for their time
and effort, particularly Student Writing Editor Rebecca Shepard, who spent countless hours providing
feedback. Finally, thank you to Christina M. Parker, Ph.D., for her never-ending patience and support,
without which I would not have finished this Comment, or law school.
1. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 12 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009).
2. Id.
3. See Peter T. Doran & Maggie Kendall Zimmerman, Examining the Scientific Consensus on
Climate Change, EOS, TRANSACTIONS, AM. GEOPHYSICAL UNION, Jan. 20, 2009, at 22 (noting that over
97% of climate experts surveyed believe that “human activity is a significant contributing factor in
changing mean global temperatures”); see also William R. L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in
Climate Change, 107 PNAS 12107, 12107 (2010) (“(i) 97–98% of the climate researchers most actively
publishing in the field support the tenets of ACC [Anthropogenic Climate Change] outlined by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and (ii) the relative climate expertise and scientific
prominence of the researchers unconvinced of ACC are substantially below that of the convinced
researchers.”); Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686, 1686
(2004) (finding that of 928 scientific abstracts surveyed that featured the key words “climate change,”
none disputed the consensus position). Additionally, many major national academies of science support
the position, including the National Academy of Science (United States), the Royal Society (United
Kingdom), the Royal Society of Canada, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Network of African Science
Academies, and the Science Council of Japan. Is There a Scientific Consensus on Global Warming?,
SKEPTICAL SCI., http://www.skepticalscience.com/global-warming-scientific-consensus-intermediate
.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2011). Finally, most major American scientific bodies support the position,
including the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Astronomical Society,
American Chemical Society, American Geophysical Union, American Institute of Physics, American
Meteorological Society, American Physical Society, the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Id. While some contest a consensus, their views
rarely
withstand
scrutiny.
Compare
GLOBAL
WARMING
PETITION
PROJECT,
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changing, humans are the primary cause, and without significant
actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, the world faces
potentially catastrophic long-term consequences.5 Potential and
observed consequences include sea level rise,6 increases in both
drought and flooding,7 the melting of Arctic sea ice,8 greater
http://www.petitionproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (asserting that many scientists dispute the
consensus on global warming), with H. Josef Hebert, Jokers Add Fake Names to Warming Petition,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 1, 1998, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date
=19980501&slug=2748308 (noting the Oregon Petition at times contained many fake names, including
Perry S. Mason and Robert C. Byrd, the fictitious lawyer and real-life Senator, respectively, as well as
Dr. Ginger Geri Halliwell, a.k.a. Ginger Spice), and Kevin Grandia, The 30,000 Global Warming
Petition Is Easily-Debunked Propaganda, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2009, 4:47 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-grandia/the-30000-global-warming_b_243092.html (noting that
the Oregon Petition contains few practicing climate scientists and many unverifiable credentials). While
some fake names have subsequently been removed, both Mason and Byrd, at least, are still listed on the
Oregon Petition. See GLOBAL WARMING PETITION PROJECT, supra.
4. In this Comment, I will use the terms climate change, anthropogenic (caused or produced by
humans) climate change, and global warming interchangeably, even though climate change and global
warming are not inherently synonymous and the climate may change in response to many mechanisms
other than human-induced global warming. For the purposes of this Comment, the terms refer to the
phenomenon whereby humans add greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane to the
atmosphere, the additional gases prevent more of the sun’s energy from reflecting back into space, and
the Earth warms and the climate changes in response. How Do We Know More CO2 is Causing
Warming?, SKEPTICAL SCI., supra note 3. For a far more thorough and detailed explanation of the
phenomenon and the history of scientific understanding on the topic, see Hervé Le Treut et al.,
Historical Overview of Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ch. 1 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007); Spencer
Weart & Am. Inst. Physics, Introduction: A Hyperlinked History of Climate Change Science,
DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING (May 2010), http://www.aip.org/history/climate/summary.htm.
5. See IAN ALLISON ET AL., UNIV. OF NEW S. WALES CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH CTR., THE
COPENHAGEN DIAGNOSIS, 2009: UPDATING THE WORLD ON THE LATEST CLIMATE SCIENCE 7 (2009)
(“Delay in action risks irreversible damage . . . . The turning point must come soon . . . .”).
6. Id. (“By 2100, global sea-level is likely to rise at least twice as much as projected by Working
Group 1 of the IPCC AR4 . . . .”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 150
(“[R]ecent estimates of global sea-level rise substantially exceed the IPCC estimates, suggesting sealevel rise between 3 and 4 feet in this century.”).
7. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 15 (“Anthropogenic climate change is expected to lead to
further increases in precipitation extremes, both increases in heavy precipitation and increases in
drought.”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 33 (“In the future, droughts
are likely to become more frequent and severe in some regions.”); id. at 64 (“Such intense precipitation
is likely to increase the frequency and severity of events such as the Great Flood of 1993.”).
8. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (“Summer-time melting of Arctic sea-ice has accelerated far
beyond the expectations of climate models.”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note
1, at 39 (“Arctic sea ice is declining rapidly and this is very likely to continue.”). Indeed, in September
2012, summer arctic sea ice set records for lowest recorded minimum extent and volume in the satellite
record. See Ramez Naam, Arctic Sea Ice: What, Why and What Next, SCI. AM. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2012/09/21/arctic-sea-ice-what-why-and-what-next/; see
also Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. (Sept.
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occurrences of extreme weather events,9 glacial melting,10 ocean
acidification,11 and the triggering of feedbacks that will dramatically
increase warming.12 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) released its Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) in 2007,
a massive document that synthesized the research on climate
change.13 Since the release of that report, newer studies indicate that
the IPCC AR4 underestimated the timing and scale of many of the
possible impacts—some consequences are happening sooner than
expected and many predictions for future consequences grow direr
each year.14
19, 2012), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonalminimum/.
9. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 105 (“[F]uture increases in
[insured] losses will be attributable to climate change as it increases the frequency and intensity of many
types of extreme weather, such as severe thunderstorms and heat waves.”). These extreme events also
include “more frequent hot days, hot nights and heat waves; fewer cold days, cold nights and frosts;
more frequent heavy precipitation events; more intense and longer droughts over wider areas; and an
increase in intense tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic but no trend in total numbers of
tropical cyclones.” ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 15.
10. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 23 (“These new assessments . . . show glacier and ice cap
contributions to sea level rise that are generally slightly higher than those reported in IPCC AR4.”).
11. Id. at 36 (“The increase in ocean CO2 has caused a direct decrease in surface ocean pH by an
average of 0.1 units since 1750 and an increase in acidity by more than 30%.”). Ocean acidification
results not from the increase in temperature caused by global warming, but from the increase in carbon
dioxide the oceans absorb, and it alone represents a potentially catastrophic consequence. U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 151–52 (“In addition to carbon dioxide’s heat-trapping
effect, the increase in its concentration in the atmosphere is gradually acidifying the ocean. . . . As a
result of these and other stresses, the corals that form the reefs in the Florida Keys, Puerto Rico, Hawaii,
and the Pacific Islands are projected to be lost if carbon dioxide concentrations continue to rise at their
current rate.”).
12. Climate feedbacks are processes that either amplify or lessen the climate’s response to stimuli.
Sandrine Bony et al., How Well Do We Understand and Evaluate Climate Change Feedback
Processes?, 19 J. CLIMATE 3445, 3445 (2006). Global warming feedbacks include: the melting of Arctic
sea ice, which decreases the Earth’s albedo (reflectivity) and causes more energy to be absorbed into the
oceans, which in turn contributes to more melting sea ice; increases in water vapor in the atmosphere;
and the melting of the arctic permafrost, releasing massive amounts of stored carbon dioxide and
potentially methane. JOSEPH ROMM, HELL AND HIGH WATER: GLOBAL WARMING—THE SOLUTION AND
THE POLITICS—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO 17–18 (2007). For further discussion of feedbacks
associated with global warming, see ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 14, 22–23, 44, 49; Bony et al.,
supra at 3445. For more information on the permafrost feedback, see Methane Releases from Arctic
Shelf May Be Much Larger and Faster than Anticipated, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=116532&org=NSF&from=news.
13. The entire report can be downloaded piecemeal at INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012).
14. See generally ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra
note 1; see also Julienne Stroeve et al., Arctic Sea Ice Decline: Faster Than Forecast, 34 GEOPHYSICAL

Published by Reading Room, 2013

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 5

826

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

While the scientific understanding of climate change has solidified
substantially in the past two decades, national governments have
taken little significant action to combat the problem, particularly the
United States.15 The United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol16
and has yet to pass any new legislation that would establish
significant reductions in emissions from stationary sources17 or set a
price on carbon, either through a tax or cap-and-trade system.18
RES. LETTERS L09501 (2007); Neven, Models Are Improving, But Can They Catch Up?, ARCTIC SEA
ICE BLOG (Sept. 17, 2012), http://neven1.typepad.com/blog/2012/09/models-are-improving-but-canthey-catch-up.html (discussing the Stroeve article, supra, and updating its graph with data from the past
five years).
15. See Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 43A STAN. J.
INT’L L. 77, 82–84 (2007).
16. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Climate Change Treaty, to Go Beyond the Kyoto Protocol, Is Expected by
the
Year’s
End,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
13,
2009,
at
A5,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/science/earth/13climate.html.
17. See Alex, supra note 15, at 82–84. The Obama administration did pass new emissions standards
for light vehicles and trucks. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
85, 86 & 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537 & 538). Additionally, the EPA issued a Tailoring
Rule that implements a permitting program that subjects the largest stationary emitters of greenhouse
gases to permitting requirements under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V
sections of the Clean Air Act. Action to Ensure Authority to Implement Title V Permitting Programs
Under the Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,254 (Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 52 & 70). However, the PSD requirements only apply to new major stationary sources, or
stationary sources undergoing modifications leading to significant emissions increases. Prevention of
Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(49)(iv)–(v) (2012). Similarly, the new
emissions standards promulgated by the EPA only apply to light-duty vehicles such as cars and light
trucks, and not to heavy trucks or other large transportation vehicles. See Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. at
25,329–30. While these are laudable achievements, they fall far short of the efforts scientists say are
needed to combat climate change. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (noting that emissions must
peak by 2020 and then rapidly decline in order to limit impacts of global warming). In the Carbon
Mitigation Initiative’s strategy to combat global warming, for instance, efficiency satisfies only one of
the fifteen “wedges” needed to stabilize the atmosphere onto a “safer course,” and increasing the fuel
efficiency of cars to sixty miles-per-gallon is only one part of total efficiency efforts needed to meet that
wedge. Stabilization Wedges Introduction: Building the Stabilization Triangle, CARBON MITIGATION
INITIATIVE, PRINCETON U., http://cmi.princeton.edu/wedges/intro.php (last updated July 27, 2011); see
also Big Picture Solutions, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/so
lutions/big_picture_solutions/big-picture-solutions.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
18. For an explanation of cap-and-trade, see Cap and Trade 101: What is Cap and Trade, and How
Can We Implement it Successfully?, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 16, 2008),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/capandtrade101.html. For an explanation of a carbon
tax,
see
Introduction:
What’s
a
Carbon
Tax?,
CARBON
TAX
CENTER,
http://www.carbontax.org/introduction/ (last updated Dec. 12, 2012). For an economic analysis of
passing such measures, see generally Paul Krugman, Building a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2010, at MM34, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/11Economyt.html?pagewanted=all.
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Indeed, many politicians and media members resist even admitting
that a problem exists.19 Using tactics taken from the Big Tobacco
playbook of decades past, some politicians, fossil fuel trade groups,
and think tanks have sought to obfuscate the issue in the hopes of
delaying action.20
Despite minimal federal action on climate change and denial of the
issue by some, the problem persists.21 Scientists are already detecting
impacts of climate change both globally and specifically in the
United States.22 Tired of waiting for federal action, individual states,
advocacy groups, and private parties sought new channels to combat
anthropogenic climate change.23 Beginning in the 2000s, advocates
19. Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma famously called global warming “the greatest hoax ever
perpetrated on the American people.” 151 CONG. REC. S18 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2005) (statement of Senator
James Inhofe). Former Fox News personality Glenn Beck called it the “discredited global warming
scam.” Glenn Beck: Global Warming’s Real Inconvenient Truth, GLENN BECK (Dec. 15, 2009, 2:59
AM), http://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/198/34222/. Governor Rick Perry of Texas, a
2012 presidential candidate, argues that scientists manipulate data for money and claims that scientists
are coming forward every day questioning global warming. Glen Kessler, Rick Perry’s Made-Up
“Facts” About Global Warming, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2011, at A02.
20. Primarily, the tactics involve overstating scientific uncertainty to create the illusion of a genuine
scientific debate. NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 5–9
(2010). For a thorough discussion of the similarity in both the tactics and persons denying the dangers of
tobacco and climate change, see id. For thorough discussions of how industry groups, think tanks, the
media and politicians have obfuscated the issues surrounding climate change, see generally JAMES
HOGGAN & RICHARD LITTLEMORE, CLIMATE COVER-UP: THE CRUSADE TO DENY GLOBAL WARMING
(2009) and JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, THE INQUISITION OF CLIMATE SCIENCE (2011).
21. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 9 (“Climate-related changes have
already been observed globally and in the United States.”).
22. Id. (noting climate-related changes have been observed in the United States and globally).
Scientists are less certain about how much of any particular weather event is attributable to a warming
climate, and some scientists refer to “loaded dice” or “loading the dice” when discussing climate
change’s impact on individual weather events. See Jeff Masters, Jeff Masters’ WunderBlog: At least 611
Dead in Brazilian Floods: Brazil’s Deadliest Natural Disaster in History, WUNDERGROUND.COM (Jan.
14, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=1727
(noting that increased ocean temperatures make extreme rainfall events more likely); Andrew C.
Revkin, NASA’s Hansen: Humans Still Loading Climate Dice, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS, DOT EARTH (June
23, 2008, 12:24 AM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/nasas-hansen-humans-still-loadingclimate-dice/.
23. See Morgan McCue Sport, Comment, An Inconvenient Suit: California v. General Motors
Corporation and a Look at Whether Global Warming Constitutes an Actionable Public Nuisance or a
Nonjusticiable Political Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 586 (2008) (“As a result of the Bush
administration’s apparent unwillingness to address global climate change, many are now beginning to
utilize the judicial system as a means of solving these environmental problems.”). Individuals and
advocacy groups were not the only actors in this new movement; states individually began taking action.
Alex, supra note 15, at 83–84 (noting that states have begun taking action in the absence of federal
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and states turned their focus to the judicial branch and began bringing
climate change claims in courts.24 Some of these new lawsuits
challenged the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases,25 others sought
recovery for existing or future damages from climate change,26 while
still others attempted to impose judicially mandated limits on
greenhouse gas emissions.27
In 2011, American Electric Power v. Connecticut, a global
warming public nuisance suit, reached the Supreme Court.28 In a
unanimous decision,29 the Court held that the Clean Air Act (CAA)
and the EPA action it authorized “displace any federal common law
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel
fired power plants.”30 The Court’s decision left the CAA as the sole
means of setting emissions limits for fossil-fuel-fired power plants.31
This Comment addresses the state of climate change litigation in
the wake of this important case. Part I examines the litigation leading
to American Electric, beginning with the interstate nuisance cases of
the twentieth century that established the federal common law,
through the most recent and relevant climate change cases.32 Part II
discusses American Electric and then analyzes the decision and the
Court’s reasoning, suggesting that the Court reached the correct

action). For instance, California was the first state to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars. See
Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 699 (2003). It was also the first state to pass comprehensive
greenhouse gas regulations. See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2012); Sport, supra, at 609 (“[T]he State of California adopted
the nation’s first global warming regulations requiring major greenhouse gas producers to substantially
curb their greenhouse gas emissions.”).
24. See generally Jeremy Hessler, Note, A Temporary Solution to Climate Change: The Federal
Common Law to the Rescue?, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407 (2011).
25. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), discussed infra Part I.C.2.
26. See, e.g., California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007), discussed infra Part.I.C.1.c.
27. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
28. Id. In the case, several states, New York City, and private land-trusts sought an injunction
against five electric utilities. Id. at 2532. The plaintiffs sought a judicially imposed limit on annual
greenhouse gas emissions from the utilities. Id.
29. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision. Id. at 2540.
30. Id. at 2537.
31. Id. at 2538.
32. See discussion infra Part I.
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answer, but used unnecessary language to do so.33 Additionally, Part
II explores questions left unanswered by the Court.34 Part III
examines litigation tactics still available to advocates of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions after American Electric, and suggests that
litigation is still a vital tool in fighting global warming.35
I. FROM GEORGIA TO CONNECTICUT: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE
BECAME A NUISANCE
A. Georgia And Illinois Create Federal Common Law
In 1907, the Supreme Court “implicitly created the federal
common law of nuisance.”36 The Court, in Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., held that a state, “in its capacity of quasi-sovereign,”
may bring an action seeking abatement of or payment for interstate
pollution.37 In language since quoted many times, Justice Holmes
noted that states have a right to protect their air, lands, and populace:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign
that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great
scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be
they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they
have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by
the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards
38
on its hills should not be endangered from the same source.

Justice Holmes was wary, however, that “peculiarities necessarily
mark” such suits39: notably, states are likely to seek abatement as
33. See discussion infra Part II.A–B.
34. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
35. See discussion infra Part III.
36. Hessler, supra note 24, at 417.
37. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“[I]t is plain that some such demands
must be recognized, if the grounds alleged are proved . . . . [T]he alternative . . . is a suit in this court.”);
see also Hessler, supra note 24, at 417 (“The Court held that a state may use federal courts in order to
receive injunctive relief against transboundary polluters in other states, and thus created the cause of
action.”).
38. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238.
39. Id. at 237.
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opposed to money damages, as the intrinsic value of lands, air, and
health is difficult to assess.40 While the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins famously pronounced “[t]here is no federal general
common law,”41 there are exceptions, and Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co. is the foundation of one such exception.42
That exception was expanded post-Erie in the seminal
environmental case Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I).43 While
Georgia concerned interstate air pollution, Milwaukee I dealt with
interstate water pollution.44 In Milwaukee I, the State of Illinois
sought leave to file suit under the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction against four Wisconsin cities and two local sewerage
commissions for dumping sewage into Lake Michigan.45 The Court
noted the similarities in its treatment of interstate air and water
pollution,46 and Justice Douglas plainly stated, “[w]hen we deal with
air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal
common law.”47 In a prescient moment, however, he noted, “[i]t may
happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in
time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance.”48 The
Court then held that interstate water pollution cases arising under
federal law may be brought in a federal district court and may be
initiated by states.49 In so doing, the Court established what has been

40. Id. (noting that states may be more entitled to an injunction than a private party).
41. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
42. See Alex, supra note 15, at 85 (“The clear implication of the Court’s more recent rulings is that
Tennessee Copper is as valid today as it was in 1907.”).
43. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis. (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972); see Matthew F. Pawa &
Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 430 (2005) (noting that Milwaukee I is “the leading Supreme Court case
on the federal common law of public nuisance”).
44. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 105 (“Our decisions concerning interstate waters contain the same theme [as found in
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.].”).
47. Id. at 103.
48. Id. at 107.
49. Id. at 99 (“The question is whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters creates actions
arising under the ‘laws’ of the United States within the meaning of [§] 1331(a). We hold that it does;
and we also hold that [§] 1331(a) includes suits brought by a State.”).
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called “the modern framework for the federal common law of public
nuisance.”50
B. Milwaukee II Introduces Displacement
Justice Douglas’s observation in Milwaukee I, that federal laws
might displace some federal common law claims of nuisance, came
to fruition nine years later in Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II).51
In the interim between the Milwaukee I and II, Congress enacted
legislation that would later become the Clean Water Act (CWA).52 In
Milwaukee II, Justice Rehnquist first noted that federal common law
is displaced when Congress not only speaks directly on the issue,53
but when it “occupie[s] the field.”54 He further noted that unlike
preemption of state law, displacement of federal common law did not
require a “clear and manifest purpose” by Congress.55 Finally, the
Court held that Congress, through its 1972 amendments, had not only
spoken directly on the issue,56 but had occupied the field with “a
comprehensive regulatory program,”57 and thus Illinois no longer had
a federal common-law remedy.58 Milwaukee I clarified when
interstate pollution qualified as a federal common law nuisance,59
while Milwaukee II demonstrated that such federal common law is
displaced when federal law occupies that particular field.60
50. Pawa & Krass, supra note 43, at 440.
51. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
52. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). Though the foundation
for the Clean Water Act was laid with the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, “sweeping
amendments” were made in 1972. History of the Clean Water Act, EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/cwahistory.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2012). Further amendments
and an official name change to the Clean Water Act came in 1977. Id.
53. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 (“[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a
decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal
courts disappears.”).
54. Id. at 317.
55. Id. (“‘[W]e start with the assumption’ that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the
appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).
56. Id. at 325–26 (noting the CWA affords States “ample opportunity” to challenge the permitting
decisions of neighboring States).
57. Id. at 317.
58. Id. at 332.
59. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
60. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 332.
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C. The Modern Climate Change Cases
The major modern climate change cases generally fall into two
categories. First are the nuisance-based claims that seek either
greenhouse-gas limits from various sources, or money damages from
major greenhouse-gas emitters.61 Second are regulatory challenges—
to the EPA and other federal agencies—that seek to regulate
greenhouse gases, or ensure that federal actions account for climate
change.62 The cases discussed below were all filed after the initial
American Electric claims were filed,63 but most were decided before
American Electric reached the Supreme Court.64
1. Nuisance-Based Claims
While Milwaukee I and II laid the foundations of federal common
law nuisance and displacement principles, they were confined to
instances of water pollution.65 The CWA specifically provides means
for states to address interstate water pollution,66 and as a
61. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 598
F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2012); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007). For a thorough examination and categorization of climate change litigation, see generally David
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence
or Business As Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012).
62. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ.
859(NRB), 2005 WL 2414744 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005).
63. The original American Electric complaints were filed in 2004. Complaint, Connecticut v. Am.
Elec. Power Co. (Connecticut I), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP)),
2004 WL 5614397; Complaint, Connecticut I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d
309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 04 Civ.
5670(LAP)), 2004 WL 5614409.
64. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in American Electric in December 2010. Am. Elec. Power
Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010).
65. Both cases focused on the dumping of pollutants into Lake Michigan. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S.
304 (1981); Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
66. For instance, the CWA requires that states that may be affected by pending permits for discharge
of water pollutants receive notice and have a right to comment in public hearings and submit written
recommendations to the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (2006). Based on the hearings, written
recommendations, and the EPA’s discretion, the EPA may veto permits. See id. § 1342(d)(2); see also
Alex, supra note 15, at 88 (“[T]he amended Clean Water Act allowed Illinois to participate in the permit
issuing process, so it was not left without a federal forum in which to protect its interests in clean
water.”). Additionally, state governors may initiate citizen suits against other states for violating
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comprehensive regulatory regime, it occupies the field of interstate
water pollution.67 The CAA,68 on the other hand, only covers certain
discharges to the air from certain sources.69 Thus, it was not clear
whether the CAA would displace climate change actions based on
common law nuisance claims in the same way that the CWA had
preempted interstate water pollution claims,70 and climate change
nuisance claims began appearing in federal courts.
a. The Strange Case of Comer
In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, residents and landowners of the
Gulf Coast brought an action in the Southern District of Mississippi
against several oil companies in 2007.71 While the plaintiffs did not
raise any federal causes of action, they did bring state claims of
public and private nuisance.72 Plaintiffs—residents of the Gulf Coast
who were reeling from the devastation wrought by Hurricane
Katrina—argued that the defendants’ emissions of greenhouse gases
contributed to global warming, which increased the intensity of the
hurricane73 and led to the destruction of their private property and
emissions standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. States may also, through citizen suits, sue the EPA administrator
for failure to perform any non-discretionary acts under the CWA. Id.
67. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317.
68. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified generally as 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671).
69. See Alex, supra note 15, at 89 (“[T]he Clean Air Act regulates only a defined body of pollutants
emitted from specified sources.”). The CAA regulates only those pollutants that the EPA administrator
deems a threat to public health and welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A). The CWA, on the other hand,
regulates, with exceptions, the discharge of any pollutant from any point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
70. Pawa and Krass boldly stated in 2005, “there is no preemption.” Pawa & Krass, supra note 43, at
463. This proclamation was made before the Supreme Court ruled that carbon dioxide was a pollutant in
Massachusetts v. EPA, so Pawa and Krass’s analysis may have been correct. Indeed, even after
Massachusetts, the Second Circuit held in Connecticut v. American Electric that such claims were not
displaced. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Connecticut II), 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
71. Named defendants included ExxonMobil Corp., Shell Oil Co., and Murphy Oil USA, among
others. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 858 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d
208 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
72. The plaintiffs also brought claims of “trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.” Id. at 859–60.
73. Research on the link between climate change and hurricanes is still inconclusive; however, early
results indicate that while the rates of Atlantic hurricanes may or may not decrease due to climate
change, the hurricanes that do form have a greater chance of intensifying into more destructive storms
due to higher sea levels and greater sea surface temperatures. See LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 46
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“public property useful to them.”74 They sought both compensatory
and punitive damages, but not abatement.75 The district court
dismissed the claims, holding the plaintiffs did not have standing and
the claims represented nonjusticiable political questions.76 The Fifth
Circuit initially reversed the district court, holding the plaintiffs had
standing to bring their nuisance claims and such claims were not
barred by the political question doctrine.77 On a rehearing en banc,
however, the Fifth Circuit lost a justice to recusal and thus its
quorum.78 Lacking a quorum, it did not have the power to offer an
opinion79 and dismissed the appeal.80 Instead of contributing a circuit
opinion on the political question doctrine and standing in state law
global warming cases, the Fifth Circuit provided only uncertainty.
b. California Scheming
In the 2006 case, California v. General Motors, the state brought
an action against the six largest automobile manufacturers in the
(Abdelkader Allali et al. eds., 2007) (“Based on a range of models, it is likely that future tropical
cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes) will become more intense . . . . There is less confidence in
projections of a global decrease in numbers of tropical cyclones.”); James B. Elsner et al., The
Increasing Intensity of the Strongest Tropical Cyclones, 455 NATURE 92, 92 (2008) (“Atlantic tropical
cyclones are getting stronger on average . . . .”); Gabriele Villarini et al., North Atlantic Tropical Storm
Frequency Response to Anthropogenic Forcing: Projections and Sources of Uncertainty, 24 J. CLIMATE
3224, 3235 (2011) (“The disagreement among published results concerning increasing or decreasing
North Atlantic tropical storm trends in a warmer climate can be largely explained (close to half of the
variance) in terms of the different sea surface temperature projections (Atlantic minus tropical mean) of
the different climate model projections used.”).
74. Comer, 585 F.3d at 859.
75. See Sport, supra note 23, at 604.
76. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860.
77. Id.
78. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
79. Id. at 1055. The court noted that the grant of rehearing vacated the previous opinion. Id. at 1053.
80. Id. at 1056. The court helpfully noted, however, that “[t]he parties, of course, now have the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. at 1055. The dissenting judge, W. Eugene Davis,
found “an inexplicable disconnect between the notion that a majority of the eight unrecused judges has
no authority to do anything except literally apply our Local Rule 41.3 strictly as written; yet they do
have the authority to dismiss the appeal.” Id. at 1056 (Davis, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court
subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ petition for mandamus to reinstate their appeal. In re Comer, 131 S.
Ct. 902 (2011). The plaintiffs filed suit again in the Southern District of Mississippi in 2011. Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854 (S.D. Miss. 2012). The court there found that
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, or in the alternative, that plaintiffs
did not have standing to bring their claims and that such claims were barred by the political question
doctrine. Id. at 868.
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world, alleging the defendants’ products contributed to global
warming.81 The state filed a public nuisance claim under federal
common law, and in the alternative, a state-based public nuisance
claim.82 Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that global warming is
contributing to the loss of the Sierra snowpack—which threatens
water supplies—while earlier melting of the snowpack in spring
contributes to flooding.83 Additionally, they argued that rising sea
levels pose a threat of greater erosion to California’s 1,075 miles of
coastline.84 The state sought damages, not abatement,85 and also
sought a declaratory judgment “for such future monetary expenses
and damages as may be incurred by California in connection with the
nuisance of global warming.”86 California argued that it was not
asking the court to solve climate change, but merely seeking damages
resulting from the defendants’ contributions to global warming.87 The
court disagreed and reasoned that the case was barred by the political
question doctrine.88 It noted that a “federal common law global
warming nuisance tort would have an inextricable effect on interstate
commerce and foreign policy—issues constitutionally committed to
the political branches of government,”89 and dismissed the case.90
The court’s holding thwarted California’s attempt to circumvent the
political question doctrine by seeking only damages.91 While

81. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
17, 2007). Included were General Motors, Daimler Chrysler, Toyota, Nissan, Ford and Honda. Alex,
supra note 15, at 78 n.2.
82. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *2.
83. Sport, supra note 23, at 610.
84. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *1.
85. See id. at *14.
86. Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment at 14, California v. Gen.
Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (No. C06-05755
EMC), 2006 WL 3069165.
87. Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public
Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a “Global Warming Solution” in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591, 597
(2008).
88. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *12 (“Plaintiff’s current tort claim would require this
Court to make the precise initial carbon dioxide policy determinations that should be made by the
political branches . . . .”).
89. Id. at *14.
90. Id. at *17.
91. Abate, supra note 87, at 598.
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providing more guidance than Comer, California still left
unanswered how state law claims would fare.92
c. Standing in Kivalina
In 2009, the Village of Kivalina93 brought a federal common law
claim of nuisance, as well as state law claims, in the Northern District
of California.94 The plaintiffs named twenty-two defendants,
including major oil and electric utility companies like ExxonMobil
and American Electric Power Company.95 The complaint alleged that
the defendants’ “excessive emission[s]” of greenhouse gases
contributed to global warming and led to diminished Arctic sea ice—
which traditionally protected the village from winter storms—and as
a result the village would have to be relocated.96 The Village asserted
that by seeking damages instead of an injunction, it was not asking
the court to decide what emissions limits “should have been
imposed” on the defendants.97 The court did not find the damagesonly argument persuasive.98 Further, the court found that the Village
could not be certain which emissions were directly responsible for
92. After dismissing the federal claim, the court held it did not have supplemental jurisdiction over
California’s state law claim, nor did it rule on whether the CAA would displace federal claims. Gen.
Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 at *16.
93. The Village of Kivalina is a “the governing body of an Inupiat Eskimo village of approximately
400 people who reside in the City of Kivalina” in Alaska. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
94. Id. at 869.
95. Id. at 868 n.1 (“Defendants are: (1) ExxonMobil Corporation; (2) BP P.L.C.; (3) BP America,
Inc.; (4) BP Products North America, Inc.; (5) Chevron Corporation; (6) Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; (7)
ConocoPhilips Company; (8) Royal Dutch Shell P.L.C.; (9) Shell Oil Company; (10) Peabody Energy
Corporation; (11) The AES Corporation; (12) American Electric Power Corporation; (13) American
Electric Power Services Corporation; (14) DTE Energy Company; (15) Duke Energy Corporation; (16)
Dynergy Holdings, Inc.; (17) Edison International; (18) MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company; (19)
Mirant Corporation; (20) NRG Energy; (21) Pinnacle West Capital Corporation; (22) Reliant Energy,
Inc.; (23) The Southern Company; and (24) Xcel Energy, Inc.”).
96. Id. at 868. The decline of summer Arctic sea ice has been called a “death spiral” by Mark
Serreze, the director of the National Snow and Ice Data Center. See Peter Wadhams, Geoengineering
May Be Our Best Chance to Save Sea Ice, SCI. AM., Dec. 2012, at 12, available at
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=geoengineering-last-chance-save-sea-ice. This death
spiral was evident in the record-low summer sea ice extent and volume recorded in September 2012. See
Naam, supra note 8.
97. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876. The village estimated the cost of moving at “$95 to
$400 million.” Id. at 869.
98. Id. at 876 (noting that the village’s argument rested on “faulty logic”).
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the injury.99 The court dismissed the federal claim, asserting that the
plaintiffs failed to establish causation necessary for Article III
standing and that the claim was barred by the political question
doctrine.100 As in California, the court dismissed the state law claims
without prejudice.101
The decisions in the modern nuisance suits demonstrate the
uncertainty litigants faced in bringing climate change nuisance suits
before American Electric. Other litigants, however, were adopting
another strategy: using regulatory appeals to spur federal action on
climate change.102
2. Regulatory Appeals: Massachusetts Challenges the EPA
In 2005, twelve states, four local governments, and several
environmental groups103 brought suit against the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in the D.C. Circuit for its denial of a
petition requesting it to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA.104
The EPA, along with ten intervening states and several trade
organizations,105 argued that either it did not have the statutory
99. Id. at 881 (noting that emissions from various countries, emitted over decades, could be the
particular cause of the village’s injury).
100. Id. at 882. The court held that the plaintiffs did not qualify for relaxed standing requirements
based on “‘special solitude’ generally afforded to sovereigns.” Id. It found that the plaintiffs were “not
seeking to enforce any procedural rights concerning an agency’s rulemaking authority,” nor were they
able to rely on the “‘quasi sovereign interests’ referenced by the Supreme Court” in Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Id.
101. Id. at 882–83. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal in 2012 and relied on the holding of
American Electric. This affirmation is discussed in more detail in Part II.B.2.a.
102. For a list of the many global warming related statutory and regulatory challenges, see Michael B.
Gerrard & J. Cullen Howe, Climate Change Litigation in the U.S., 2–12, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP,
http://www.climatecasechart.com (last updated Oct. 2, 2012).
103. The states bringing the suit were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. at 505 n.2. The local governments were District of Columbia, American Samoa, New
York City, and Baltimore. Id. at 505 n.3. The environmental groups were the Center for Biological
Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates,
Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for Technology
Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of
Concerned Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group. Id. at 505 n.4.
104. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
105. The intervening states were Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505 n.5. The trade groups were the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, National Automobile Dealers Association, Engine

Published by Reading Room, 2013

15

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 5

838

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

authority to regulate the gases under the CAA,106 or if it did have the
authority, it chose not to regulate those gases.107 The circuit court
ruled that the EPA administrator properly exercised his discretion in
denying the petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.108 The
decision did not contain a definitive ruling on the standing of the
plaintiffs.109
The Supreme Court, noting the “the unusual importance” of global
warming, granted certiorari.110 In a five-to-four decision, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the claims,111 the CAA
unambiguously authorized the regulation of greenhouse gases,112 the
EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases,113 and that the
EPA acted “arbitrarily” and “capriciously” in refusing to regulate the
gases.114 Justice Stevens, in analyzing plaintiffs’ standing, held that
states are to be afforded a “special solicitude” in protecting their
quasi-sovereign interests.115 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens then
proceeded to analyze the usual elements of Article III standing,
including injury,116 causation,117 and redressability.118 After finding
Manufacturers Association, Truck Manufacturers Association, CO2 Litigation Group, and Utility Air
Regulatory Group. Id. at 505 n.6.
106. Id. at 511–12 (“[The] EPA observed that Congress ‘was well aware of the global climate change
issue when it last comprehensively amended the [Clean Air Act] in 1990,’ yet it declined to adopt a
proposed amendment establishing binding emissions limitations.”).
107. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 53.
108. Id. at 58.
109. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 514 (noting the circuit judge proceeded on the merits because
standing and merits were overlapping inquiries).
110. Id. at 506.
111. Id. at 501, 526.
112. Id. at 529 (“Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt
‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . . the ambient air.’ The statute is
unambiguous.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006))).
113. Id. at 532.
114. Id. at 534.
115. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520. Justice Stevens noted that having ceded certain
sovereign prerogatives to the federal government, “Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, [and] it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or
India . . . .” Id. at 519. The need to protect its quasi-sovereign interests, along with its “concomitant
procedural right to challenge” agency action it believed to be arbitrary and capricious, combined to give
Massachusetts a “special solicitude” in the standing analysis. Id. at 520. For a rebuttal of Justice
Stevens’ standing reasoning, see Chief Justice Robert’s dissent. Id. at 536–49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
116. Justice Stevens asserted that the state had suffered a particularized injury as the “rising seas have
already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.” Id. at 522.
117. The Court noted first that the EPA acknowledged the causal connection between greenhouse
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standing, the Court determined that the “EPA can avoid taking
further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not
contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable
explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether they do.”119 The Court then remanded the case for
further proceedings,120 which resulted in a settlement agreement
between the EPA and petitioners.121 Massachusetts did not clarify the
uncertainties of the nuisance cases, but its effects were decisive in
American Electric.122
3. Where Are We?
The global warming cases of the past decade demonstrate some of
the issues that face courts attempting to wrestle with global warming
suits, particularly when such suits are founded in common law
nuisance claims. The Kivalina court held that the Village, not
deserving the “special solicitude” granted to states acting as quasisovereigns, lacked standing, and further, that the claim was barred by
the political question doctrine.123 The California court held the
claims barred by the political question doctrine,124 but skirted around
the issue of standing.125 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit in Comer
gases and global warming, but argued that its failure to regulate such gases was too insignificant a
contributor to Massachusetts’s injury for causation to be established. Id. at 523. Justice Stevens
countered that the U.S. transportation sector alone contributes 6% of greenhouse gas emissions, and to
regulate those emissions would “hardly [be] a tentative step.” Id. at 524–25.
118. Here, Justice Stevens stated that the remedy from the Court need only reduce the injury, not
eliminate all injury entirely. Id. at 525. He further noted that the risk of catastrophic consequences to
Massachusetts “would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek.” Id. at 526.
119. Id. at 533.
120. Id. at 535.
121. Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit 75 Fed. Reg. 82,392 (Envtl. Prot.
Agency Dec. 30, 2010) (notice) [hereinatfter Proposed Settlement Agreement].
122. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
123. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d,
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
124. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *12 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007) (“Plaintiff’s current tort claim would require this Court to make the precise initial carbon
dioxide policy determinations that should be made by the political branches . . . .”).
125. The court discussed standing in its analysis of the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, noting that
Massachusetts granted a “special solicitude” to States seeking judicial review of federal agency action.
Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *10–12. The court clarified that—unlike Massachusetts—
California was not “an administrative challenge to an EPA’s decision, but rather as an interstate global
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initially found that plaintiffs, a class of private citizens, had standing
to bring their claims and that the political question doctrine did not
bar their claims.126 With the strange dismissal after rehearing,
however, those initial decisions were tossed aside, leaving the
question of standing and political question unanswered in the Fifth
Circuit.127 None of the cases rendered decisions on the state law
claims.128 While all of those issues would indeed play a role in
American Electric, it was Massachusetts—the case rooted in a
procedural challenge—that would have the greatest impact on the
American Electric decision.
II. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY V. CONNECTICUT
A. A [Minor] Nuisance For The Supreme Court
1. Connecticut Starts in New York
In 2004, eight states and New York City129 filed a lawsuit in the
Southern District of New York against six electric utilities, including
the federally owned and operated Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA).130 Three non-profit land trusts, including the Audubon
Society of New Hampshire, filed a separate but similar suit against
the same utilities.131 The two suits were combined into Connecticut v.
warming damages tort claim,” without ever deciding whether the State actually had standing to bring
such a claim. Id. at *12.
126. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d
208 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
127. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010).
128. In General Motors Corp. and Kivalina, the court held that it could not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim after dismissing the federal claims. ExxonMobil Corp.,
663 F. Supp. 2d at 882; Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *16.
129. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2533–34, 2533 n.3 (2011). The states were
California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. at
2533 n.3. New Jersey and Wisconsin later dropped out of the litigation. Id.
130. The other defendants were American Electric Power Company, Inc., American Electric Power
Service Corporation, Southern Company, Xcel Energy, and Cinergy Corporation. Connecticut II, 582
F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
Cinergy later merged into Duke Energy. Brief for the Petitioners at II, Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174), 2011 WL 334707.
131. The other land trusts were the Open Space Institute, Inc. and the Open Space Conservancy, Inc.
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2533–34 & n.4; Joy C. Fuhr, Connecticut v. AEP: The New Normal?,
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American Electric Power Co.132 The plaintiffs asserted that the
utilities were the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the United
States, emitting up to “650 million tons of carbon dioxide each year,”
contributing up to 10% of the country’s annual anthropogenic
emissions.133 The complaint argued that the defendants were
“substantial contributors to elevated levels of carbon dioxide and
global warming.”134 The complaint further asserted that potential
injuries to plaintiffs resulting from the defendants’ contributions of
greenhouse gases included, inter alia, increased heat deaths,
increased beach erosion, and accelerated sea level rise.135
The plaintiffs brought two claims: first, a federal nuisance claim,
and in the alternative, a state nuisance claim.136 Plaintiffs sought
abatement of the public nuisance through an injunctive cap on carbon
dioxide emissions levels emitted by the utilities, arguing that
“monetary damages are inadequate to remedy the injuries.”137 In
deciding the utilities’ motion to dismiss, the district court looked to
Baker v. Carr138—a leading Supreme Court case on the political
question doctrine—and its six situations “indicating the existence of

NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2010, at 58, 58.
132. Connecticut I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
133. Brief for Respondents Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the
City of New York at 4, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174), 2011
WL 915093, at *4.
134. Complaint at 1, Connecticut I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 104CV05669), 2004
WL 5614397.
135. Id. at 1–2. The claim also alleged, inter alia, “increased ground-level smog . . . ; salinization of
water supplies . . . ; reduction of the mountain snow pack in California . . . ; lowered Great Lakes water
levels . . . ; more droughts and floods . . . ; and widespread loss of species and biodiversity . . . .” Id.
136. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2534. Under the state law claims, both the states and the land
trusts pled special injuries. Id. The land trusts noted that they were owners of real properties with
“unique ecological values” that were open to the public, and that, unless abated, global warming
threatened to “diminish or destroy the essential ecological and aesthetic attributes of their properties.”
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Private Plaintiffs’
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted at 1, Connecticut I, 406 F.
Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813
(2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 104CV05670), 2004 WL 5614418. The states pointed to the
injuries and risk of injuries described in the text. Complaint, supra note 134 at 1–2.
137. Complaint, supra note 134, at 44.
138. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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a non-justiciable political question.”139 Focusing on the third Baker
prong, the court held the case presented questions requiring “an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion” and dismissed the case.140
Before the case reached the Second Circuit on appeal in 2009,141
the Supreme Court ruled on Massachusetts v. EPA, holding that the
CAA authorized the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.142
The Second Circuit in Connecticut thus was asked to decide: (1)
whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the claims; (2) whether
their claims were barred by the political question doctrine; (3)
whether their claims were properly stated and governed by the
federal common law of nuisance; and (4) whether the plaintiffs’
claims were now preempted by the CAA.143 The Second Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the case did not
present a nonjusticiable political question144 and that the states
139. Connecticut I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (“[1] a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of the government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.” (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004))).
140. Id. at 274.
141. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S.
Ct. 2527 (2011).
142. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
143. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d at 314–15. The court also ruled on TVA’s theory “that the complaints
should be dismissed against it on the basis of the discretionary function exception.” Id. at 315.
144. Id. at 390. The Second Circuit first noted the Supreme Court’s analysis from Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267 (2004), holding that the Baker factors “‘are probably listed in descending order of both
importance and certainty.’” Id. at 321. The Court then applied the Baker factors individually, paying
special attention to the first three. Id. at 323–32. The Court found that plaintiffs were not “ask[ing] the
court to fashion a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to global climate change, a task that arguably
falls within the purview of the political branches,” but instead merely “seek[ing] to limit emissions from
six domestic coal-fired electricity plants on the ground that such emissions constitute a public nuisance
that they allege has caused, is causing, and will continue to cause them injury.” Id. at 325. Moreover, the
Court found there were “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for deciding the case and
that “[f]ederal courts have long been up to the task of assessing complex scientific evidence in cases
where the cause of action was based either upon the federal common law or upon a statute.” Id. at 329.
Finally, the Court found that the case presented “ordinary tort” issues, and therefore, there was no need
to make initial policy determinations not suited for judicial discretion. Id. at 331. For a thorough
discussion of the political question doctrine and the Second Circuit’s analysis of it in this case, see
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satisfied Article III standing by properly pleading parens patriae
standing.145 Additionally, the Second Circuit found that New York
City and the public trusts also had standing to bring the claims.146
Finally, the Circuit held that the CAA did not displace the federal
common law, as the EPA had not yet issued regulations concerning
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources.147 The Second
Circuit found that the CAA did not speak directly on the issue, and
thus plaintiffs’ claims were not displaced.148 Accordingly, the Circuit
vacated the lower court’s ruling.149
2. A Brief Response from the Supreme Court
The utility companies appealed, asserting again that Connecticut
and the other respondents lacked standing to bring their claims, that
the claims were barred by the political question doctrine, and that the
claims were displaced by the CAA.150 In December 2010, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.151 In the interim between the
Second Circuit’s decision and the grant of certiorari, the EPA
released its Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for
greenhouse gases, which found that greenhouse gases were a threat to
public health and welfare.152 As a result, the CAA mandated that the
generally Nathan Howe, The Political Question Doctrine’s Role in Climate Change Nuisance
Litigation: Are Power Utilities the First of Many Casualties?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
11229 (2010).
145. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d at 338 (noting that state interest in the physical and economic wellbeing of citizens are “classic examples of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest.”).
146. Id. at 366–69. The court held that New York City, as a subdivision of a state, sufficiently pleaded
injuries to general public rights, id. at 366, and that the public trusts were private entities functioning as
public entities, and as such would suffer harms that were unique from other private landowners. Id. at
368–69.
147. Id. at 387–88. The Second Circuit reasoned that until the EPA regulated greenhouse gas
emissions from stationary sources, the court would be unable to determine whether the regulations
spoke directly to the field of greenhouse gas emissions generated by utilities. Id. at 380–81.
148. Id. at 387–88. The Second Circuit noted that should the EPA regulate greenhouse gas emissions,
claims similar to the plaintiffs’ may indeed face displacement. Id.
149. Id. at 393.
150. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at i, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)
(No. 10-174), 2011 WL 1393804, at *i.
151. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010).
152. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (finding that six greenhouse gases (carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, hexafluoride), when well mixed,
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EPA issue regulations of greenhouse gases.153 The EPA responded
with a Tailoring Rule,154 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards
for light vehicles,155 and a rule regarding the prevention of serious
deterioration (PSD) in air quality of certain areas.156
American Electric was decided June 20, 2011. In contrast with the
Second Circuit’s thorough opinion, the Court’s opinion was fairly
short, spanning only eight pages.157 Justice Ginsburg disagreed with
the Second Circuit’s opinion and held that Congress had indeed
occupied the field through enacting the CAA, even before the EPA
actually set emissions standards for major emitters.158 Congress
delegated authority to the EPA to decide whether to regulate
greenhouse gases, and Justice Ginsburg found that delegation—and
not whether the EPA actually regulates greenhouse gases—
constituted occupying the field.159 Indeed, the Court noted that even
if the EPA chose not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, federal
common law claims of nuisance would not be the appropriate means

endanger the public health and public welfare of future generations).
153. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). The EPA released its final rules for regulating
greenhouse gases emitted from power plants in July 2012. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and
Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule Step 3 and GHG Plantwide Applicability Limits, 77 Fed. Reg.
41,051 (July 12, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
154. Action to Ensure Authority to Implement Title V Permitting Programs Under the Greenhouse
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,254 (Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 & 70). This
rule provides an “implementation strategy” for issuing federal permits to “major” stationary sources. Id.
For other criteria pollutants, 100 tons-per-year (tpy) emissions will generally constitute a major source.
Id. at 82,256. The Tailoring Rule raises that level to 100,000 tpy of greenhouse gas emissions. Id.
155. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 & 600 and 49
C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537 & 538).
156. Limitation of Approval of Prevention of Significant Deterioration Provisions Concerning
Greenhouse Gas Emitting-Sources in State Implementation Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,536 (Dec. 30, 2010)
[hereinafter PSD Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). Because the Tailoring Rule changed the
limits for major sources of greenhouse gas emissions, the PSD rule limited the application of prevention
of significant deterioration plans—in place before the Tailoring Rule—that addressed greenhouse gas
emissions.
157. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2532–40.
158. Id. at 2538.
159. Id. at 2538–39. Professor Jonathan Adler notes that the displacement analysis was the “weakest
and least convincing portion” of the Second Circuit’s opinion, as it ignored the clear language of
Milwaukee II that suggested that displacement of interstate nuisance claims depend merely on legislative
action. Jonathan H. Adler, A Tale of Two Climate Cases, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110–11 (2011),
available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/adler.html.
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of challenging that decision.160 The Court declined to decide the state
law claims, but hinted that the CAA may also preempt such
claims.161
The Court reduced the case to a single issue: displacement.162 The
standing and political question issues received scant treatment from
the Court. An equally divided Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s
decision on standing.163 Justice Ginsburg noted that four of the
justices believed at least some of the plaintiffs to have Article III
standing under Massachusetts, while the other either distinguished
the American Electric and Massachusetts cases or adhered to their
dissenting opinions from Massachusetts.164 Justice Ginsburg did not
discuss the Second Circuit’s analysis on standing, nor did she provide
any further guidance.165
After briefly setting up the issues of the political question doctrine
and whether plaintiffs had indeed stated a claim under federal
common law for the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions, Justice
Ginsburg rendered the points moot. Calling the issues an “academic
question,” the Court held that the CAA and the EPA actions it
authorizes displace any such claims.166 Finally, Justice Ginsburg
suggested that while such complex scientific determinations were
best left to expert agencies like the EPA, as opposed to “ad hoc, caseby-case injunctions” issued by district court judges,167 the agency’s
decisions would be subject to review in regulatory challenges.168
160. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538–39. Justice Ginsburg went on to explain that Federal courts
would still have the power to review the EPA’s decision, if challenged, to determine if the decision was
arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 2539.
161. Id. at 2540. The Court noted that neither party had briefed the Court on the state law claims. Id.
162. Before reaching that holding though, Justice Ginsburg first noted that the EPA was regulating
greenhouse gases in response to Massachusetts v. EPA. Id. at 2533. The Court pointed to several steps
the EPA and federal government were taking to regulate the gases: the EPA issued the Endangerment
and Cause or Contribute findings; the EPA and the Department of Transportation issued a final rule
regulating emissions from light-duty vehicles; the EPA set requirements for major stationary emitters to
use the best available control technology; and the EPA had begun rulemaking to set limits on
greenhouse gas emissions from major emitters and was committed to issuing a final ruling by May
2012. Id.
163. Id. at 2535. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision. Id. at 2540.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2535.
166. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2537.
167. Id. at 2539. This opinion was contrary to the Second Circuit’s opinion that district court judges
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B. Displacing A Nuisance: Analyzing The American Electric
Decision
1. Displacing Connecticut Through Milwaukee II
On the issue of displacement, the American Electric Court
registered a unanimous vote.169 The Court took particular guidance
from Milwaukee II, noting displacement turns only on whether
Congress has occupied the field in question, “not whether it has been
occupied in a particular manner.”170 Yet Justice Rehnquist, in
authoring the Milwaukee II opinion, was clear that Congress had
occupied the field of water pollution “through the establishment of a
comprehensive regulatory program.”171 Justice Rehnquist went
further in that case, noting that the CWA did more than merely speak
to the issue of interstate water pollution.172 He wrote that the
Amendments to the Act, coming after Milwaukee I, represented a
“total restructuring” and “complete rewriting” of existing water
pollution laws.173 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that Congress—in
creating such a “self-consciously comprehensive” regulatory system
for water pollution—left no room for federal common law to fill in
the gaps.174 Thus, when the Milwaukee II Court noted the question
was not “whether [the field] has been occupied in a particular
manner,” Justice Rehnquist was referring to specific permitting and
routinely deal with complex scientific issues when they relate to federal common law claims.
Connecticut II, 582 F.3d 309, 329 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2527 (2011).
168. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539. In noting that the EPA’s decisions would not “escape
judicial review,” Justice Ginsburg clarified the decisions would not stand if they were “arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” Id. Despite this being a notoriously low standard for agencies to
meet, it is interesting that the EPA failed to meet the standard in Massachusetts. See Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007).
169. The vote was 8-0, as Justice Sotomayor did not participate. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
Justice Alito filed a short separate opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, which concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2540–41 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
170. Id. at 2538 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981)).
171. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317.
172. Id. Indeed, Rehnquist pointed out the Federal Water Pollution Control Act before the 1972
amendments were “inadequate to supplant federal common law.” Id.
173. Id. The Milwaukee II Court further asserted that the CWA represented congressional intent to
create an exhaustive and comprehensive regime of water pollution regulation. Id. at 318.
174. Id. at 319.
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regulating decisions made within an already comprehensive
regulatory regime.175
It is not clear whether the CAA represents the same sort of
comprehensive regulatory regime as the CWA. Whereas Congress
completely rewrote interstate water pollution laws with the CWA,176
it has taken no such actions regarding global warming.177 The EPA
was forced into considering regulation of greenhouse gases in the
first instance.178 As noted by Justice Ginsburg, the EPA did respond,
putting in place initial measures to address greenhouse gas
emissions179 and proposing to release limits for electrical generating
units (EGUs)180 in May 2012.181 The CWA, on the other hand,
requires permits for every point source of water pollution.182
Dismissing that argument, the American Electric Court essentially
determined that Milwaukee II stood for the proposition that any
regulatory regime would suffice.183 It is hard to argue, though, that
the CAA and the EPA do not comprehensively regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from fossil-fuel-fired power plants, and such a narrow
reading is sufficient to justify the outcome of the case.184
175. Id. at 324. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist noted that the issue in question was the “nature of the
problems, not the extent to which the problems have been addressed.” Id. at 323.
176. Id. at 317.
177. See Alex, supra note 15, at 82–84.
178. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (noting that the EPA acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in refusing to regulate greenhouse gases).
179. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011); see also PSD Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 82,536 (Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Action to Ensure Authority to
Implement Title V Permitting Programs Under the Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,254
(Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 & 70); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7,
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 & 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537 & 538).
180. Proposed Settlement Agreement, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,392 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Dec. 30, 2010)
(notice).
181. Id. (“Under the proposed settlement agreement EPA will take final action with respect to the
proposed rule no later than May 26, 2012.”).
182. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (“Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful.”) (emphasis added). A point source is “any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance . . . from which pollutants are . . . discharged.” Id. § 1362(14).
183. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (“Congress selects different regulatory regimes to address
different problems.”).
184. Professor Adler asserts that the Court’s decision was clear, as the plaintiffs’ claims would
certainly be displaced “if the CAA’s expansive statutory scheme was to apply to GHGs . . . .” Adler,
supra note 159, at 110–11. He further asserts that the language of Milwaukee II clearly states that the
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Yet a broader reading of the case suggests that climate change
itself needs a comprehensive regulatory regime into which
contributions from greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities
would fall.185 When Justice Ginsburg opines that courts are not suited
to handle global warming nuisance claims through “ad hoc, case-bycase injunctions” due to the magnitude and complexity of the
issue,186 she demonstrates why the CAA does not occupy the entire
field of climate change mitigation: climate change is a problem of a
magnitude greater than any contemplated by the CAA. The first
purpose of the Act is “to protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare,”187 yet the emissions of greenhouse gases do more than just
degrade air resources. Ocean acidification, for instance, is another
nasty consequence of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases.188 While the CAA does include effects to water as a part of the
public welfare,189 the Act is limited to the public welfare of the
United States population.190 The world’s oceans do not belong to the
United States, and failing to address that aspect of emissions could
lead to retaliation from other nations. Further, the Act only addresses
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, and not
deforestation—the other major driver of climate change.191
Therefore, American Electric would not bar a federal common law
nuisance claim against companies who contribute to deforestation.
The Court correctly found that—in the narrow circumstances
question is not “whether the field has been occupied . . . in a particular manner.” Id. at 111.
185. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007) (arguing that “climate change had its own
‘political history’” and that Congress did not intend the CAA to apply to international atmospheric
deposits). This was one of EPA’s arguments in Massachusetts. Id.
186. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40 (noting that expert agencies are better suited to dealing
with “issues of this order”).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
188. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 36 (noting that the CO2 content of the oceans have risen by
about 100 gigatons since the beginning of the industrial revolution). This acidification threatens marine
life, and could be particularly threatening to coral reefs. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 151–52.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
190. Id. § 7401(b)(1) (noting that the Act seeks to protect the “Nation’s . . . population”).
191. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that deforestation
accounts for about 20% of anthropogenic contributions to atmospheric greenhouse-gas levels).
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presented by the case—the CAA displaces federal common law
claims of nuisance.192 Unfortunately for both advocates of climate
change action and the population at-large, global warming is not
confined to those circumstances.
2. Paralysis by [Lack of] Analysis
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric fails to answer
some questions posed by climate change litigation while
simultaneously creating others. The decision regarding displacement
was fairly straightforward and clear,193 but there was a distinct lack
of analysis regarding the other issues of the case.194
a. Abating Monetary Claims?
The Court effectively eliminated federal common law nuisance
claims against electric utilities in the fight against global warming,195
at least in cases where injunctive relief is the desired result.196 It is
hard to see how any plaintiff would survive a similar displacement
analysis in bringing a federal claim for money damages. Indeed, in
September 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
American Electric’s holding applied to damages cases.197 In
192. See Adler, supra note 159, at 110–11.
193. Id. (noting that the Justices were in complete agreement on the issue of displacement and that the
“clear language” of Milwaukee II demanded such a finding).
194. See Daniel A. Farber, Standing on Hot Air: American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of
Standing
Doctrine,
121
YALE
L.J.
ONLINE
121,
121
(2011),
available
at
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/farber.html (noting that the Court “devoted only a few cryptic
sentences” to discussing standing); Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut’s Implications for the Future
of Climate Change Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 101, 101 (2011), available at
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/osofsky.html (noting that the American Electric decision “largely
sidesteps” several of the issues).
195. Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 115, 117
(2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/burkett.html (noting such claims are barred as
long as the EPA has regulatory authority).
196. Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 135, 135 (2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/gerrard.html (suggesting
federal common law claims for money damages may still survive). Indeed, the American Electric case
explicitly refers to claims seeking injunctive relief throughout the opinion, referring to the “common law
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions” and claims seeking “curtailment of greenhouse gas
emissions.” Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).
197. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (“AEP
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affirming the lower court’s decision in Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit
held that “under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a cause of
action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.”198
Whether the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is sound is beyond the scope
of this article.199
Yet it is difficult to see why the Supreme Court did not explicitly
hold that the CAA preempted all federal common law claims of
nuisance against electric utilities for greenhouse gas emissions.200
Certainly, such a holding would have clarified the issue for future
litigants. The Court, however, declined to even analyze whether the
plaintiffs properly stated federal common law claims.201 While
Justice Ginsburg dismissed the issue as an “academic question,”202 it
is quite likely that a litigant or enterprising attorney will make it a
practical reality, wasting judicial resources on an issue that could
have been settled.
b. The State of State Claims
The Court did not rule on the state law claims of nuisance.203
Traditionally, the Court is less willing to find preemption of state law
by the federal government, requiring a finding of a manifest
congressional intent to preempt the state law.204 By failing to address
extinguished Kivalina’s federal common law public nuisance damage action, along with the federal
common law public nuisance abatement actions.”).
198. Id.
199. In reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit relied on prior Supreme Court decisions in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Id. The concurring opinion, however, noted that there was
“tension in Supreme Court authority on whether displacement of a claim for injunctive relief necessarily
calls for displacement of a damages claim.” Id. at 858 (Pro, J., concurring).
200. The Court wrote “that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law.” Am. Elec. Power, 131
S. Ct. at 2540. This was surprisingly vague language by the Court. Read in context, it might suggest that
the CAA displaces all federal common law nuisance claims relating to greenhouse gases emitted by
power plants. It almost certainly does not mean that the CAA now displaces all federal common law. As
it is unclear, this holding cannot serve as a definitive displacement to anything but federal common law
claims seeking abatement or injunctive relief against greenhouse gas emitters.
201. Id. at 2537.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2540 (noting that the state law claims had not been briefed).
204. See id. at 2537; Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008); Adler, supra note 159, at 112
(noting more than a federal act is required to preempt state law).
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the issue, the Court again guarantees that courts will hear state law
claims for the abatement of greenhouse gases.205 In Georgia, for
instance, a plaintiff might bring a nuisance suit under terms that are
more favorable to plaintiffs than federal nuisance claims.206
Theoretically, certain states might become hotspots of global
warming nuisance suits.207 Consequently, companies may face the
prospect of multiple suits in various states with no certainty of a
single outcome.208 Without proper briefing, however, the Court was
in no position to decide the issue, and properly remanded the
remaining claims.209
c. Splitting on Standing
The Court’s equally divided affirmation of the Second Circuit’s
opinion on jurisdiction did little to clarify the issue of standing in
climate change litigation cases.210 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the
dissenters on this issue either distinguished American Electric from
Massachusetts v. EPA or simply adhered to their dissents from that
case.211 Unfortunately, this murky approach does little to inform
future litigants. Were new plaintiffs to reach the Supreme Court—
perhaps seeking monetary damages in a state law claim—would
those dissenting Justices again distinguish the case from
Massachusetts v. EPA, or simply decide they did not wish to follow
the precedent they had previously set? Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s
205. See Osofsky, supra note 194, at 103 (finding that American Electric does not affect the “large
number” of state law claims challenging power plants emissions of greenhouse gases).
206. Georgia statutory law describes a nuisance as “anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, or
damage to another” so long as the inconvenience would affect an “ordinary, reasonable man.” O.C.G.A.
§ 41-1-1 (2012). The Restatement, contrastingly, requires an “unreasonable interference” with rights.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). A common-sense analysis would indicate that the
former is a lower threshold to meet than the latter, and knowing that federal claims are now barred,
litigants might be encouraged to bring their claims to the state courts.
207. Delaware, known for its flexible corporate law, is the most prominent state for corporate
lawsuits. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 60 (2009) (noting “Delaware’s preeminence in corporate law”).
Could a similar situation emerge in climate change litigation law?
208. See supra text accompanying notes 205–07.
209. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
210. Farber, supra note 194, at 122 (noting that the court’s decision left the reasoning of individual
justices “mysterious”).
211. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535.
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subtle jab at the dissenting Justices hints that political ideology may
have been a factor.212 Additionally, it is unclear how the holding
affects the standing of private plaintiffs in future climate change
litigation suits.213
3. Scientific Complexity or Political Uncertainty?: Dicta as
Distortion
a. Every Breath You Take . . . Could Lead to Federal Lawsuits
Perhaps the most disappointing aspects of the American Electric
decision were the dicta that seem to question the importance of action
on anthropogenic global warming.214 While the Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA noted “[t]he harms associated with climate
change are serious and well recognized,”215 the Court in American
Electric, in comparing the CAA to the CWA, noted “Congress could
hardly preemptively prohibit every discharge of carbon dioxide” as
humans emit carbon dioxide “merely by breathing.”216 This dictum
gives credence to the slippery-slope argument, suggesting that
greenhouse gas emissions are different from water pollution and

212. Farber, supra note 194, at 122 (noting the ideological nature of Article III standing and that the
conservative Justices did not find standing in Massachusetts v. EPA). Professor Farber interprets the
American Electric opinion as indicating that the dissenting Justices from Massachusetts v. EPA simply
“held their ground.” Id.
213. Compare Osofsky, supra note 194, at 103 (noting the American Electric decision does not
clarify whether nongovernmental entities or persons acting alone have standing to bring claims), with
Environmental Law and Climate Change Community Podcast: Steve Jones Discusses American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut, LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES (Aug. 8, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/environmental-climatechangelaw/blogs/climatechange/archive
/2012/10/17/lexisnexis_ae00_-environmental-law-and-climate-change-community-podcast_3a00_steve-jones-on-american-electric-power-co.-v.-connecticut.aspx (claiming that state, city, and private
plaintiffs all have standing to bring claims).
214. See Burkett, supra note 195, at 118 (noting that the Court took “time in its relatively slender
decision to inject doubt about elements of climate science”).
215. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (noting that the EPA itself relied on an
“objective and independent assessment” that pointed to the numerous significant harms resulting from
global warming) (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,930 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Sept. 8, 2003) (notice))).
216. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538. This argument fails to recognize that humans also emit
effluent wastes merely through their use of the restroom, yet the CWA still manages to prohibit the
“discharge of any pollutant” unless the polluter obtains a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
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could subject every citizen and small business to lawsuits.217 Indeed,
one amicus brief for the petitioners suggested that an affirmative
ruling by the Court would “permit literally anyone alleging climatechange based damages to sue any entity or natural person in the
world.”218
While the slippery-slope argument is alluring, it is faulty and
unnecessary. Taking the extreme example of a lawsuit based on a
person breathing, basic principles of causation would likely prevent
such non-meritorious claims from succeeding. Quite simply,
breathing, by its very nature, cannot contribute to the anthropogenic
global warming; indeed, human emissions of carbon dioxide—
generated by breathing—are part of a closed-loop cycle.219
While human breathing may not become a source of litigation,
there is some merit in the fears that a judicial affirmation in American
Electric might have subjected small businesses to suits for their
emissions.220 But, the Court needed only look at the CAA itself and
its definitional limits for “major stationary source[s]” to see that
setting reasonable limits is quite feasible.221
The Court also reasoned that district courts are simply not capable
of imposing injunctions on an “ad hoc, case-by-case” basis,222 or that
217. The amicus brief of the United States Chamber of Commerce depicts suits that “will destabilize
our economy, undermine our democratic process, and impact sensitive foreign policy consideration.”
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of
Petitioners at 5–6, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174), 2011 WL
396512 at *5.
218. Id. at 5.
219. Frequently Asked Global Change Questions, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CENTER,
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/faq.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). All the carbon in the human body comes
from plants, either that we eat, or that the animals we eat ate. Does Breathing Contribute to CO2
Buildup in the Atmosphere?, SKEPTICAL SCI., http://www.skepticalscience.com/breathing-co2-carbondioxide-intermediate.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2010). Those plants recently absorbed carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere, thus forming the cycle with human breathing. Id.
220. In Massachusetts v. EPA, for instance, Massachusetts pled injuries that were fairly de minimis at
the time. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–23, 526 (noting only 10–20 centimeters of global sea
level rise and that the risk of catastrophic harm to the State was “remote”). A crafty lawyer could easily
argue that if such de minimis impacts were sufficient to create an actionable injury, certainly any small
business’s contribution to global greenhouse gas levels would be enough to warrant judicial action.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (“[T]he terms ‘major stationary source’ and ‘major emitting facility’ mean
any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one
hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant.”).
222. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539. This opinion was contrary to the Second Circuit’s opinion
that district court judges routinely deal with complex scientific issues when they relate to federal
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such injunctions would invariably lead to inequalities. Yet the courts
already hear cases based on complex scientific issues223—including
both products liability and nuisance claims—and it is possible that
decisions or settlements in climate change nuisance cases would
force Congress to speak directly on the issue with a new Act or
amendments, as they did after Milwaukee I.224
The decision in Massachusetts v. EPA essentially ensured that
claims like those brought in American Electric would not survive.225
The Court reasoned properly that the CAA, in light of the decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, preempted federal common law claims
seeking abatement of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel-fired
power plants.226 Justice Ginsburg’s dictum serves only to give
ammunition to future litigants in climate change litigation not
preempted by American Electric.
b. The Court as Climatologist?
Justice Ginsburg’s dicta also indicated that judges may not
“commission scientific studies or convene groups of experts for
advice.”227 This implies two things: first, federal courts are not
competent to handle complex scientific issues; and second, that
courts would need to commission more research on climate change
before competently deciding climate change cases. As to the first,
courts frequently make decisions based on studies and testimony of
experts.228 The Court declared the need for trial courts to handle
common law claims. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d 309, 328–29 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813
(2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
223. Connecticut II, 582 F.3d at 329.
224. As Justice Rehnquist notes in Milwaukee II, after Milwaukee I Congress completely restructured
water pollution laws within the United States. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
225. Adler, supra note 159, at 109–10 (noting that many of the same litigants were involved in both
the Massachusetts v. EPA and American Electric cases, and that the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA
“all but assured” the decision in American Electric).
226. Id. at 110–11 (noting that the Second Circuit ignored the clear reasoning of Milwaukee II
requiring only legislative action, and that the relevant question was not the manner in which Congress
occupied the field, but only if it had occupied the field).
227. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
228. The Supreme Court, in determining that carbon dioxide was a pollutant under CAA definitions in
Massachusetts v. EPA, relied heavily on the testimony of climatologist Michael MacCracken. See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–25 (2007).
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complex scientific issues—in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals—when it established that a trial court judge “must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence” is both
relevant and reliable.229 While the Daubert standard is not used in
administrative challenges like Massachusetts v. EPA,230 it exists
precisely to allow judges to act as gatekeepers against poor scientific
evidence.231
Despite the second implication of Justice Ginsburg’s comment,
courts do not need to commission new studies on climate change to
decide climate change cases. First, it is not the courts’ job to create
new scientific data, but rather to exercise gatekeeping duties and only
admit “[p]ertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles.”232 Second, should the courts need more clarity on any
particular area of the science, there are almost certainly studies
dealing with the issue.233 In Daubert, Justice Blackmun asserted the
Court should be more optimistic in the capabilities of juries to wade
through scientific evidence.234 The Court should likewise exhibit the
same confidence in district courts to handle cases dealing with
complex scientific material.
229. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
230. Ryan Hackney, Note, Flipping Daubert: Putting Climate Change Defendants in the Hot Seat, 40
ENVTL. L. 255, 260 (2010) (noting that neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to
administrative law cases).
231. Id. at 264–65 (noting Daubert’s two-prong test for admitting scientific evidence).
232. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
233. The history underpinning the science of climate change—and humanity’s role in it—stretches
back as far as 1824, when Joseph Fourier first noted that “atmospheric gases trap heat, raising the
surface temperature” of the earth. POWELL, supra note 20, at 36. There are hundreds of studies published
just in the few years since the cutoff to the fourth IPCC assessment. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
This is not to imply that climate science is settled on every issue; there are many areas of uncertainty left
in the field of climate science that require more research. See BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 73, at 72–73
(noting both “robust findings” and “key uncertainties” in climate science). Nevertheless, the climatescience community is confident that the climate is changing and that human emissions of greenhouse
gases constitute the major cause. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 12. Even
with uncertainties, it is clear humanity faces grave consequences if we do not significantly reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 73, at 65, 72–73 (“Adaptation is necessary
both in the short term and longer term to address impacts resulting from the warming that would occur
even for the lowest stabilisation scenarios assessed. . . . Unmitigated climate change would, in the long
term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, managed and human systems to adapt.”); U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 12. There is enough science for courts to make
decisions on climate change litigation.
234. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
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While the Court was correct that the CAA displaced federal
common law claims seeking abatement of greenhouse gas emissions
from fossil-fueled-fired power plants, it incorrectly asserted that
absent such displacement, district courts have neither the knowledge
base nor the ability to hear such claims. With its distracting decision,
the Court clarified only that federal common law nuisance claims for
abatement of emissions by fossil-fuel-fired power plants are
preempted by federal law. Litigants, lawyers, and legislators are left
to determine the best path forward in the fight against catastrophic
climate change, and the role the courts will have in that fight.
III. AMERICAN ECLECTIC: USING ALL LITIGATION OPTIONS IN THE
FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING
While the decision in American Electric answered few questions,
the Court was clear that expert agencies under the authority of the
federal government are in the best position to address global
warming.235 Nevertheless, the current regulatory system is inadequate
to handle climate change,236 and until Congress speaks directly on
climate change in toto with new legislation, states and advocates will
continue to initiate climate change litigation. Climate change
advocates, including states, face two questions: what litigation
options are still available, and is litigation still an effective means of
effectuating change in light of the EPA’s authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions? The answers are fairly simple: many
litigation options are available, and advocates must use all of those
litigation options in the fight against climate change.
A. Litigation Options
American Electric removed one arrow from the litigation quiver of
climate change advocates—federal common law nuisance claims
235. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011).
236. For instance, the CAA does not address global warming contributions from deforestation, nor
from stationary sources that do not qualify as major. It does not provide a means for moving citizens
whose land is lost from climate change, as in Kivalina, nor does it provide a means of recovery for
private citizens who have lost their land, their homes, or their lives from climate change.
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seeking abatement of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel-fired
power plants.237 The American Electric dicta suggest that other forms
of climate change litigation would suffer the same fate upon reaching
the Court.238 Yet by failing to explicitly rule on anything other than
the narrow issue, the Court left the door open for many forms of
climate change litigation.
Commentators have suggested various approaches to climate
change litigation.239 Nuisance still remains an option in state law
claims240 and potentially in federal common law claims seeking
damages as opposed to abatement,241 though the Court’s opinion in
American Electric suggests that the judicial system is not suited to
handle such claims.242 Tort law also provides other avenues of
litigation potentially available to litigants, including claims for
misrepresentation, fraud, and product liability.243
The tobacco industry lawsuits of the 1990s may provide guidance
to climate change litigants in tort suits. Some commentators suggest
using the tobacco litigation as a model for litigation against oil and
car companies for health dangers related to their pollutions,244 and a
237. See Burkett, supra note 195, at 115.
238. Indeed, much of the dicta indicate that the climate change issues are too large and complex for
the judiciary. See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40.
239. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 781 (2010) (using public trust doctrines in
“adaptive management-based climate change adaptation regimes”); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to
a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003)
(developing various tort theories of climate change litigation); Angela Lipanovich, Comment, Smoke
Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation is
Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429 (2005) (using tobacco tort litigation as a model for suits
against the auto and oil companies).
240. Adler, supra note 159, at 112.
241. Gerrard, supra note 196, at 135 (suggesting that federal common law claims for money damages
may still survive). The litigation begun in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil is pending review in
the Ninth Circuit, and may provide further guidance. See Burkett, supra note 195, at 116. The Ninth
Circuit will thus have a chance to decide whether the CAA also preempts federal common law claims of
nuisance seeking damages, among the other issues the case presents. For a discussion of the case, see
supra Part I.C.1.c.
242. Adler, supra note 159, at 112 (noting that the American Electric decision could “chill” state
based nuisance claims).
243. See Grossman, supra note 239, at 39. But see Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public
Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C. L. REV. 201, 204 (2010)
(noting that the tort model is the “wrong tool”).
244. See generally Lipanovich, supra note 239, at 429. But see Thomas A. Donovan, Litigation: An
Antidote for Democracy, FED. LAW., Feb. 2007, at 8, 9, 28 (arguing that tobacco litigation is not a valid
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similar strategy may be used in the climate change context. Critics
have argued that the comparison of the tobacco and fossil fuel
industries is not valid by noting that carbon dioxide itself is not
harmful to humans, unlike tobacco smoke.245 It is unclear, however,
that a substance must be inherently dangerous to humans to be the
subject of litigation.246 Moreover, the comparison between the
industries is one of form rather than substance. Both the fossil fuel
and tobacco industries have the financial resources to extend
litigation as long as possible.247 Further, both industries have sought
to obfuscate the truth about the dangers of their products.248 If
litigants can reach the discovery stage against major fossil fuel
companies, they may be able to uncover documents similar to those
resulting from tobacco litigation that clearly showed the tobacco
companies knew their products were harmful.249 Indeed, some similar
internal documents from fossil fuel companies have already been
exposed.250 Companies may begin settling if more evidence of
deliberate misinformation can be found.
Finally, many federal statutes provide avenues of litigation relating
to climate change. Citizen suits are available under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA)251 and the CAA.252 While the National
comparison for global warming suits).
245. Donovan, supra note 244, at 9, 28 (“[C]arbon dioxide is an essential component of the basic food
cycle by which green plants produce oxygen and sugars.”). Donovan also uses the same fallacious
reasoning that led Justice Ginsburg to make her “merely by breathing” comment. Id. at 28 (“Every
breath a human being takes produces carbon dioxide.”).
246. Water, for instance, is also a basic building block of animal and plant life, yet few would protest
a landowner suing to stop another landowner from dumping thousands of gallons of water onto the first
landowner’s property.
247. See Grossman, supra note 239, at 6 (noting both the tobacco and fossil fuel industries’ “ability to
challenge everything” resulting from vast financial resources).
248. See generally ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 20 (discussing both the tactics and persons
involved in creating doubt about the dangers of smoking and global warming).
249. To view documents unearthed in tobacco litigation, see generally TOBACCODOCUMENTS.ORG,
http://tobaccodocuments.org (last visited July 19, 2012). Included among the documents is the infamous
1969 “doubt is our product” memo that suggested using doubt to counter the body of facts linking
smoking to cancer. Smoking and Health Proposal, TOBACCODOCUMENTS.ORG, supra.
250. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS & HOT AIR: HOW EXXONMOBIL
USES BIG TOBACCO’S TACTICS TO MANUFACTURE UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 10 (2007),
available at www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/exxon_report.pdf.
251. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006). See generally Lawrence Liebesman, Elizabeth Lake & Peter
Landreth, The Endangered Species Act and Climate Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
11173 (2009); Hanspeter Walter, Comment, The Outer Limits of Endangered Species Act Liability—the
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not have a citizen suit
provision, citizens can challenge compliance with NEPA under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).253
Climate change litigants will have to address many of the issues
the Court left undecided in American Electric. Discussing each of
these issues in detail is beyond the scope of this Comment.254 It is
fairly certain, however, that in any tort-related suits, the issues of
standing and political question will continue to play a role. The
purpose of the lawsuit, however, will likely dictate which type of
claim a litigant chooses, and any claim—whether regulatory or for
damages—may play a part in combating global warming.
B. The Heat Goes On: Litigation As A Tool
1. Monitoring Current Enforcement
In light of the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions and the Court’s decision in American Electric, global
warming activists must ask themselves whether litigation is still a
useful way to spur governmental action. Indeed, it may be that such
litigation is becoming counterproductive. Is it time to “call off the
dogs” and let the federal government work? The answer is a
resounding no.255 Concerned advocates and states must continue to
litigate climate change issues.
ESA’s Indirect Effect Regulation and Its Application to Climate Change, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10204 (2011).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). This section allows for citizen suits against any party for, inter alia,
violating emissions standards, but not for recovery of damages. Id. § 7604(a).
253. 86 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 12 (2005). Under the APA, citizens may seek judicial review of
agency decisions to determine if those decisions were arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2);
see also Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of Greenhouse
Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473, 473 (2010) (arguing that while NEPA does not require consideration
of climate change effects, “inclusion of climate change in NEPA documentation is inevitable”).
254. For more information on the issue of standing, see Farber, supra note 194, at 121. For more
information on the political question doctrine as it applies to climate change litigation, see generally
James R. May, AEP v. Connecticut and the Future of the Political Question Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 127 (2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/may.html.
255. But see David A. Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, 18
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9, 11–12 (2010) (noting that the common law courts are not the “appropriate
institutions to address the problem of climate change”).
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Climate change is an issue that requires action sooner rather than
later.256 While the EPA, as an expert agency, may be in the best
position to deal with the issue, as the American Electric Court
suggests, it would be unwise for advocates to postpone litigation for
two reasons: first, the EPA’s ability and authority to regulate
greenhouse gases are subject to change; and second, even if the EPA
regulates those emissions, the process may be delayed. The EPA, an
administrative agency, is subject to policy changes with each new
president.257 Future policy changes may undermine any regulatory
action the EPA takes on greenhouse gas emissions.258 Moreover, the
agency is subject to the whim of Congressional funding. Hostile
Republican legislators in 2011 threatened the EPA’s ability to
enforce any of its regulations.259 Congressional rhetoric portrays the
agency as a job-killing behemoth.260 Precious time will be lost if
advocates refrain from litigating the issue and Congress manages to
limit or repeal the agency’s ability to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions.
Even if Congressional threats to the EPA do not succeed,
American Electric suggests that the EPA’s authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions displaces federal common law nuisance
claims, even if the EPA refuses to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from existing power plants.261 Delays in the rulemaking process

256. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (“The turning point must come soon.”).
257. See Shahrzod Hanizavareh, Affirming the Status Quo? Regulating the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Ozone, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 599, 604 (2009) (noting that it is difficult to determine
what priorities the EPA will follow under a “new administration”).
258. See May, supra note 254, at 131 (noting that many 2012 presidential candidates “have made
blocking EPA action on climate change a priority”).
259. See Lisa P. Jackson, Op-Ed, “Too Dirty to Fail”?: House Republicans’ Assault On Our
Environmental Laws Must Be Stopped, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A31, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/21/opinion/la-oe-jackson-train-act-20111021
(noting
that
Republicans in the 2011 House of Representatives have “averaged roughly a vote every day . . . to
undermine the Environmental Protection Agency”).
260. See James Rosen, Regulation Nation: EPA Chief Rejects GOP Charges She’s Imposing JobKilling Rules, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/22/regulation
-nation-epa-chief-rejects-gop-charges-shes-imposing-job-killing-rules/.
261. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538–39 (2011). Justice Ginsburg did note
that an EPA decision not to issue regulations would be subject to judicial review, albeit on an arbitrary
and capricious standard. Id. at 2539.
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could postpone any actual regulation of those emissions.262
Furthermore, the EPA’s authority to regulate and the regulations
themselves are often challenged in court,263 which could lead to
further delay in implementing new regulations. Thus, advocates must
use litigation to put pressure on the EPA to ensure it complies with
its duty to regulate greenhouse gases. That pressure should be shifted
to fossil fuel companies if the EPA fails to issue regulations that are
sufficient to make an impact on global warming.
2. Turning Up the Heat on Congress: Litigating to Legislate
The only solution to anthropogenic global warming is a concerted
global effort.264 Such an effort cannot succeed without the leadership,
or at least support, of the United States.265 Real change in the United
States requires comprehensive legislation that covers all facets of
global warming: greenhouse gas emissions, land use, efficiency, and
sustainable growth. In addition to maximizing time until the EPA
either issues regulations or is prevented from doing so by Congress,
litigation advances the goal of such comprehensive legislation in
three ways.
First, litigation keeps the pressure on fossil fuel companies and
other large emitters. Comprehensive legislation is a near
impossibility as long as the largest contributors to global greenhouse
gas emissions are able to exert powerful control over the nation’s
262. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)
(No. 10-174), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10174.pdf (noting that “[a] lot can happen to delay or derail” the EPA’s promise to issue EGU limits in
May, 2012).
263. Indeed, the Tailoring Rule and Endangerment findings have already been challenged, and,
thankfully, upheld. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113–14 (D.C. Cir.
2012). For more information about this case, see generally Ayesha Rascoe & Jonathan Stempel, U.S.
Court Upholds EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Rules: Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, WESTLAW
J. ENVTL., July 3, 2012, at 1.
264. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (“To stabilize climate, a decarbonized global society—
with near-zero emissions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases—needs to be reached well
within this century.”).
265. Bill Blakemore, U.N. Leader on Global Warming: We Need U.S. Leadership, ABC NEWS (Sept.
24, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/GlobalWarming/story?id=3645491&page=1 (noting that
China will not impose strict carbon emissions limits until the United States does, and that the United
States “must set the example”).
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energy policy and the climate change discussion.266 While the
companies have the financial resources to battle in court, it is
imperative that advocates and states make them do so. One need only
look at the tobacco litigation of the 1960s through the 1990s to
understand that success against a major industry is possible.267 Here,
though, the stakes are even higher. The chances of obtaining a largescale settlement from the fossil fuel industry is likely smaller now
that the Court has ruled that some federal common law nuisance
claims are displaced, because lower courts may hold that nuisance
claims for money damages are also displaced.268 However, advocates
of climate change legislation should keep trying to obtain such a
settlement through other tort remedies. A substantially damaging
settlement may encourage fossil fuel companies to reposition their
assets into more sustainable technologies to avoid more settlements,
thus minimizing future emissions. Alternatively, if the fossil fuel
companies feel threatened enough, they may begin to use their clout
to persuade Congress to pass comprehensive legislation to protect
their industry from such wide-ranging suits.269
Second, litigation keeps the issue in the public consciousness
during a time when the media is failing at its responsibilities to the
public.270 The media’s coverage of climate change has been both
inadequate and misleading.271 Indeed, some polls suggest Americans
266. See Dan Froomkin, How the Oil Lobby Greases Washington’s Wheels, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/how-the-oil-lobby-greases_n_845720.html (last updated
June 6, 2011, 6:12 AM) (noting the difficulty of repealing oil subsidies due to the influence of the oil
lobby). For a discussion of the way climate science was manipulated in the Bush administration, see
HOGGAN & LITTLEMORE, supra note 20, at ch. 13.
267. Hessler, supra note 24, at 437–38 (noting that after decades of successful litigation, tobacco
companies finally were required to pay out massive settlements).
268. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
Adler, supra note 159, at 112 (noting other nuisance claims may be “chilled”).
269. There is obviously no guarantee that comprehensive legislation crafted in response to fossil fuel
industry lobbying would achieve the goals of climate change advocates. Indeed, such legislation could
produce results that prevent positive results in slowing or halting climate change. It would, however,
provide more certainty for litigants and establish a framework in which advocates and states could
operate.
270. See Joe Romm, The New York Times Asks “Where Did Global Warming Go?” While Ignoring
Its Own Failed Coverage, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Oct. 16, 2011, 12:48 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
romm/2011/10/16/345114/ny-times-asks-where-did-global-warming-go-while-ignoring-its-own-failedcoverage/.
271. Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Behind the Curve: The National Media’s Reporting on
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believe less in climate change now than just a few years ago.272
Litigation, especially high-profile litigation, forces the issue into the
public sphere, even though it may receive a negative connotation in
the media. The more the public hears about the issue, the greater
chance that people will demand their local and state politicians take
action.
Finally, litigation sends a clear message to Congress that simple
appeasements will not suffice.273 Comprehensive legislation is
needed—legislation that mandates consistently declining emissions
levels while simultaneously propping up replacement sources of
energy.274 Fill-in measures, like the EPA’s authority to regulate
emissions from power plants, are not sufficient. Humans need
energy, and there can be no doubt that we must strike a balance
between energy needs and risks to the environment. Catastrophic
climate change, however, is simply a risk that we cannot take; it
overwhelms the short-term benefits we receive from the burning of
fossil fuels.275 Advocates and states must demonstrate to Congress
Global Warming, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 485, 485 (2006) (“[T]he press has unwittingly distorted
coverage of global warming science by uncritically accepting the industry view that the science is in
dispute.”); see also AARON HUERTAS & DENA ADLER, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, IS NEWS
CORP. FAILING SCIENCE?: REPRESENTATIONS OF CLIMATE SCIENCE ON FOX NEWS CHANNEL AND IN
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL OPINION PAGES 7 (2012), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/docu
ments/global_warming/Is-News-Corp-Failing-Science.pdf (finding “93 percent of 40 representations of
climate science on Fox News Channel to be misleading”); Ben Dimiero, FOXLEAKS: Fox Boss
Ordered Staff to Cast Doubt on Climate Science, MEDIAMATTERS FOR AM. BLOG(Dec. 15, 2010, 8:00
AM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/201012150004; Media Coverage of Climate Change/Global
Warming, CENTER FOR SCI. & TECH. POL’Y RES., http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/media_coverage/
(last updated Jan. 2013) (showing a decrease in climate change coverage in worldwide newspapers since
2009).
272. Majority of Republicans No Longer See Evidence of Global Warming, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov.
2, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1126. But see ANTHONY
LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE MASON UNIV.
CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: PUBLIC
SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY POLICIES IN MAY 2011 2, 19 (2011), available at
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/PolicySupportMay2011.pdf (finding 71% of Americans
believe climate change should be a medium, high, or very high priority, including 50% of Republicans).
273. Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605,
1649 (2007) (“[T]he greatest function of litigation may be to prod legislative action.”).
274. See supra note 264.
275. Not only does the risk of catastrophe grow with each passing year of inaction, so too grows the
cost of moving to clean energy. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7; Press Release, Int’l Energy
Agency, The World is Locking Itself into an Unsustainable Energy Future Which Would Have FarReaching Consequences, IEA Warns in its Latest World Energy Outlook (Nov. 9, 2011), available at
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through continuing litigation that the issue is critical and that
plaintiffs like those in Kivalina and Comer are suffering genuine
losses that demand redress that current statutes do not currently
provide.
CONCLUSION
American Electric proved less important for the precedent it set
than for the questions it left unanswered. While courts wrestled over
standing, the political question doctrine, and displacement in climate
change nuisance cases in the years preceding American Electric, the
Supreme Court relied only on the clear displacement path illuminated
by its earlier decision in Massachusetts. While the decision in
American Electric narrowed the litigation options that climate change
advocates have at their disposal, it subtly sent a message to Congress
that greater federal action is needed. In writing such a narrow ruling,
Justice Ginsburg also sent a message to states and advocates—
whether intentionally or not—that climate change litigation is not
dead. Until Congress enacts comprehensive climate change
legislation, global warming lawsuits will, and must, continue.

http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2011/november/name,20318,en.html (“Delaying
action is a false economy: for every $1 of investment in cleaner technology that is avoided in the power
sector before 2020, an additional $4.30 would need to be spent after 2020 to compensate for the
increased emissions.”).
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